I reproduce below the text of my article
with the same title. It was published in the Financial Express today.
In the recent TRAI consultation paper
titled Delivering Broadband Quickly: What do we Need to do?, the issues delineated for stakeholder consultation give the impression that the solution lies in controlling or influencing technological choices or costs. In a liberalised sector, healthy competition accompanied by efficient regulation would mean that market dynamics guide appropriate technological and cost choices, without government intervention. When regulatory interventions go beyond what is necessary to correct market failure, they create and exacerbate market distortions, doing more harm than good. India’s abnormally low ratio of wirelines to wireless connections is part of the broadband problem. While the paper has fleetingly mentioned public sector monopoly in this segment, it has not related the same to poor and falling wireline penetration in our country. Nor has it mentioned the abysmal state of rural broadband penetration, which persists in being negligible in spite of billions of rupees of funding to the incumbent in support of its wireline services by way of access deficit charges and universal service funding.
The relationship between competitive service provision and innovation, quality, and long-term growth in telecommunications is too well known to ignore, and unless efforts are made to correct underlying regulatory problems and consequential market distortions, we may not be able to move forward.
Sadly, one of the most market-friendly initiatives of the government which is key to promotion of broadband—the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF)—has also fallen prey to the same lack of understanding. The USOF subsidy is given to willing market players (universal service providers or USPs) to cover the viability gap and hence encourage them to provide services in commercially unviable areas. The USOF subsidised facilities are owned by USPs rather than by the government. Thus, USOF is potentially a valuable tool for minimalistic, targeted interventions to achieve greater penetration of broadband in a competition friendly manner.
A very important aspect of preventing market distortion is ensuring technological neutrality and competitive neutrality. The former would imply defining deliverables to be achieved through the USOF subsidy, while leaving specific technology choices and configurations to USPs’ wisdom. The latter implies that no entity operating in an economic market should be subject to undue competitive advantages or disadvantages.
It is well known that while the government as regulator is supposed to ensure a level-playing field, the government as owner of public enterprises may face difficulties in balancing various conflicting commercial and non-commercial interests.However, regulatory neutrality, which encompasses both technological and competitive neutrality, is a sine qua non for economic efficiency or welfare maximisation.
From data available on the USOF website
, it would appear that USOF’s present regulatory framework has been unsuccessful in this regard. USOF had disbursed R17,580 crore of subsidy up to January 31, 2014, of which rural fixed line telephony and broadband based schemes taken together account for about 95%. Yet rural teledensity at 43% is made up almost entirely of private sector wireless connections. Rural wireline teledensity is less than 1% and broadband penetration negligible. BSNL’s monopoly in the rural wireline and optic fibre segment has meant that majority of the USOF support (focused disproportionately on fixed lines) has been given to BSNL on nomination basis. The other technologies mentioned in the Trai paper would perhaps have been deployed by USPs long ago, had USOF’s schemes been technologically neutral.
The USOF website reveals that the roll out of deliverables by BSNL as USP has been delayed consistently. For example, against a target of approximately 8.8 lakh broadband connections and 28,000 broadband kiosks by January 2014 under the Wireline Broadband Scheme, BSNL had provided only about 4.3 lakh broadband connections and less than 11,000 kiosks. Despite its poor track record, BSNL was chosen as one of the three PSUs to partner in the National Optical Fibre Network (NOFN) project through the creation of Bharat Broadband Network Limited (BBNL).
NOFN’s tardy progress has been documented in the consultation paper. While dwelling on which model to adopt for rural OFC backhaul, the USOF model of reverse bidding with the lowest bidder (public or private) setting up open access networks under contract was considered, but rejected as being tedious and long drawn, as it involves subsidy benchmarking. Instead, the BBNL route was chosen. The result of this choice made three years ago is out there for us to see. BBNL has not made even a dent in the targeted roll out (2.5 lakh gram panchayats by 2014) and what’s worse is the reported doubling of estimated costs from Rs 20,000 crore (A crore is 10 million) to more than Rs 40,000 crore.
Going forward, a focus on regulatory neutrality would be the order of the day and a major part of what needs to be done.